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Abstract: This article introduces the development of China’s consumer credit, and analyses 
consumer credit behaviors with three game theory models, including fundamental game theory 
model of consumer credit behavior, improvement game theory model and repeated game model. 
Though analyzing these models, the article obtains the operating mechanism of consumer credit, 
and comes to conclusion that the complete sharing of consumer credit information in society is the 
technical support to develop consumer credit, and building Personal Credit Information 
Management System as soon as possible is the most urgent affair to the development of China’s 
consumer credit now. 
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Résumé: L’article présente le développement de la consommation à crédit de la Chine et analyse 
les comportements de consommation à crédit avec trois modèles de la théorie du jeu, à savoir le 
modèle de la théorie du jeu fondamental, le modèle de la théorie du jeu amélioré et le modèle de la 
théorie du jeu répété. A travers l’analyse de ces trois modèles, l’auteur trouve le mécanisme 
opératoire de la consommation à crédit et tire la conclusion que le partage des informations sur la 
consommation à cédit dans la société constitue le support technique du développement de cette 
consommation et que l’établissement du Système de Management de l’Information sur le Crédit 
personnel le plus vite possible est l’affaire la plus urgente dans le développement de la 
consommation à crédit de la Chine. 
Mots-Clés: consommation à crédit, théorie du jeu, information sur la consommation à crédit 
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1．INTRODUCTION 
 
The goal of the economic system reform of China is to 
set up the socialist market economy with Chinese 
characteristics. Market economy is an economic system 
that market is the main way to distribute the social 
resource. Market economy is a kind of contract 
economy, and credit is its foundation. So, it becomes an 
important stage in the economic system reform course 
of China that setting up a social environment of 
stressing credit. The credit environment in the range of 
the whole society includes the contents of three respects: 
Public Credit, or call it the Government Credit, 
Business Credit and Personal/Consumer Credit. 
Personal credit consumption is one of the concrete 
expression forms of Consumer Credit. It development 
will promote the development of Consumer Credit 
further, and will be favorable to the building-up work of 
the credit environment of the whole society too. At the 
same time, the consumer market of China transformed 
seller's market from buyer's market from the second half 
of 1996, the economy of China has been facing the 
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problem that the effective demand is insufficient. This 
has influenced the development of national economy to 
a certain extent. Personal credit consumption which can 
transfer future consumption into immediate 
consumption will improve the immediate consumption 
demand, and expand the immediate consumer market, 
and stimulate immediate economic development. 
Personal credit consumption has a history of more 
than 100 years in the West, and China’s modern 
consumer credit began in 1987, signed by the housing 
mortgage loan of China Construction Bank. Although 
China’s consumer credit has gained a great 
development, and there have been all kinds of credit 
facilities for consumer in the market, but the 
development level of China’s personal credit 
consumption is still low. In developed countries, 
personal credit loan is a main revenue source to 
commercial banks, but in China’s commercial banks, 
the personal credit loan is one percent of their total loan, 
and the revenue from the personal credit is much lower 
than those commercial banks’ in developed countries. 
At present, the main personal credit facilities are still 
only limited to Personal Housing Loan, Personal 
Automobile Consumption Loan, Education Loan, and 
Daily Consumption Loan in China, even if credit card, 
rely mainly on debiting to type credit card (the real 
credit card is a remembering type credit card of the 
loan). Personal credit consumption doesn’t popularize 
and get extensive development yet in China.  
Under the background, it is necessary to research the 
operating mechanism of consumer credit behavior. 
Based on the research, we can find the key factor in the 
whole process of the behavior, and make a theoretical 
foundation for the development of the consumer credit. 
The research is useful to build a healthy personal 
consumption credit system for China. 
 
2．METHODOLOGY 
 
Game Theory is a tool which is used to research the 
decision and the equilibrium, when the decision 
makers’ behaviors affect directly each other. For 
example, when a person’s or a company’s choice is 
affected by another person’s or another company’s 
choice, and the choice can also affect other’s, Game 
Theory can be used to study the decision and 
equilibrium. So, Game Theory can also be called 
“Theory of Games”. 
In consumer credit activities, the consumer applies 
the credit loan to the commercial bank. According to the 
consumer’s credit investigation information, the 
commercial bank makes decisions that whether give 
agreement or not, and how much loan would be given. 
Once the consumer gets the loan, he would pay off in 
the prescriptive time, or not pay off. This process is a 
game between the commercial bank and the consumer 
in substance. We can use game theory to study what the 
commercial bank and the consumer would do in order to 
get maximum income in the process under different 
conditions. 
 
3. GAME THEORY MODEL OF 
CONSUMER CREDIT BEHAVIOR 
 
Let iM ( iM >0) is the credit facility that the 
commercial bank gives the consumer in ith  time; ir  is 
the load interest (0< ir <1); iR  is the rate of return 
on iM . In most conditions, iR  is bigger than ir . 
 
3.1  Fundamental Game Theory Model of 
Consumer Credit Behavior 
According to the actions of the players and their payoff 
in the game, we can give the Payoff Matrix of the 
consumer and the commercial bank in some credit 
activity (see Fig.1). 
If the commercial bank chooses “agree”, the 
consumer will get )( iii rRM −  income when his 
choice is “fulfilling agreement” or get iM  income 
when his choice is “Violating agreement”. The 
consumer’s best response is “violating agreement”, 
when the commercial chooses “agree”. If the 
commercial chooses “refuse”, the consumer will get 
zero no matter what he may do. Correspondingly, if the 
consumer chooses “Performing agreement”, the 
commercial bank will get ii rM  income when its 
choice is “agree” or get zero when its choice is “refuse”. 
Obviously, in one shot game, the players will act 
according to the principle of maximizing respective 
interest, and the Nash equilibrium of the game is (refuse, 
violating agreement). 
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Fig. 1 Fundamental Game Theory Model of Consumer Credit behavior 
 
3.2  Improvement Game Theory Model of 
Consumer Credit Behavior 
The substance of consumer credit is a kind of lending 
behavior on the foundation of contract, and this kind of 
contract is protected by the laws in our modern society. 
The consumer’s violating agreement is a kind of 
behavior against the laws, and he would get punishment 
more than the income of violating agreement.  
We suppose that the commercial would prosecute 
when the consumer broke the agreement. iN  is the 
consumer’s punishment of the breach of the agreement 
about in ith  time; in is the indemnity that the 
consumer gives the commercial bank; C  is the 
commercial bank’s litigation expense. We can get the 
game tree of the game in Fig. 2. 
Fig. 2 Improvement Game Theory Model of Consumer Credit Behavior 
We use backward induction to solve the game. 
（1） CnrM iii −+ > iM−  
From the game tree, the commercial bank’s best 
action is “prosecution” in the third stage (the 
commercial bank’s second choice). In the second stage, 
the consumer knows that if he chooses “violating 
agreement”, the commercial bank will choose 
“prosecution” in the third stage, so the consumer’s best 
action is “fulfilling agreement” in the second stage. In 
the same, the commercial bank’s best action is “agree” 
in the first stage. Then, we can get the dynamic game’s 
sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium — (agree, fulfill 
agreement), and the plays’ payoff is 
)),(( iiiii rMrRM − . 
（2） CnrM iii −+ < iM−  
As the same deduction as (1), in the case, (refuse, 
violating agreement) is the game’s sub-game perfect 
Nash equilibrium, the players’ payoff is (0, 0). 
From the game model, if the litigation expense is too 
high, the commercial bank’s best action will be 
“non-prosecution”, and the game’s result is the same as 
the first model, and the consumer credit also can’t 
circulate. 
 
3.3  Repeated Game Model of Consumer 
Credit Behavior 
Actually, a consumer could not apply the credit facility 
only one time in his whole lifetime, but a lot of times. So 
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the game is a repeated game between the consumer and 
the commercial bank. We can see the game in Fig 3. 
CB----the commercial bank 
C------the consumer 
A------agree 
R------refuse 
F------fulfill agreement 
V------violate agreement 
Fig. 3 Repeated Game Model of the Consumer Credit 
We suppose that the consumer apply the loan for the 
commercial bank n  times, and then the game is a 
repeated game. We use backward induction to draw a 
conclusion that the consumer chooses “violating 
agreement” every time, and the commercial chooses 
“refuse” every time. It is the so-called “Chain Store 
Paradox”. The unique solution of “Chain Store 
Paradox” is to master the concept of incomplete 
information. If the information is incomplete and the 
repeated game has limited times, the game will have 
different equilibrium with one shot game. Supposing the 
game repeats many times, and the players have enough 
patience, (agree, fulfilling agreement) is a sub-game 
perfect Nash equilibrium of the game. 
Because the repeated game has not the last stage, we 
can not solve the game by backward induction. In the 
process of the repeated game, we let δ discount factor. 
If the consumer chooses “violating agreement” in some 
stage of the game, he will get iM  income and 
iii RMM −  net income. If the game satisfies the 
following condition: δ−≤ 1
ii
i
RM
M  and iR−≤ 1δ  
If iR−≤ 1δ , in the game between the consumer 
and the commercial, the commercial bank will agree the 
consumer’s apply, and the consumer would fulfill the 
agreement. (fulfilling agreement, agree) is a sub-game 
perfect Nash equilibrium. B 
But in the repeated game between the consumer and 
the commercial bank, the consumer‘s later applies will 
be refused by the commercial bank because of his 
violating agreement at one time. And the amount of load 
increases in direct proportion to the times of the 
fulfilling agreement, so the consumer’s losses are not 
)()( iii rRMin −− , but ∑
=
+ −
n
it
ttt rRM )(1
（ ni ,,1L= ; tt MM ≥+1 ） .Then, because the 
long-range benefits are more than the present benefits, 
the consumer will choose “fulfilling agreement” under 
the drive of rational maximum self’s benefits in the 
repeated game, and the players will choose the 
(fulfilling agreement, agree) strategies. At last, the game 
attains Pareto Dominance, and the payoff of the players 
is )),(( iiiii rMrRM − . 
3.4  The importance of sharing consumer 
credit information completely 
The improvement game model or the repeated game 
model is based on the complete sharing of consumer 
credit information. Contrarily, without the sharing of 
the information, the measures in the later two models 
wouldn’t be carried out easily. 
In order to increase the possibility of the loan on 
credit and obtain more, credit applicants might fill in 
some false consumer information. Moreover judging 
the consumer information true or not is difficult, for 
example, consumer properties, because the commercial 
bank has not enough true information about it. At one 
time, because of the limitation of punishment dynamics 
in law, these people who broke promise could not be 
punished in law. As a result, the cost price of the 
violating agreement behavior is little in practical life, 
and the probability of consumer violating agreement 
behavior will increase. 
In addition, if consumer credit information isn’t 
completely shared among the commercial banks, the 
consumer’s behavior of the violating agreement 
behavior in one bank will not be known by other banks. 
After he gets credit facility from one bank, he will break 
the contract, and then he will continue applying to the 
credit from other banks. So the sum that he has got all of 
the credit from the banks maybe is larger than the 
income of the credit in all of his life. 
Therefore, consumer credit information being fully 
shared in whole society, at lease in all of commercial 
banks, is the most important technical support to the 
development of consumer credit. It makes the finite 
game between a consumer and a commercial bank into 
the infinite game between the consumer and all of 
commercial banks. Based on the transformation, the 
credit consumption can get a safety support and develop 
stably. Furthermore, sharing consumer credit 
information completely is a complementarities and 
extension of law punishment for the violating 
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agreement behavior. To a greater degree, sharing 
consumer credit information completely in whole 
society can heighten the punishment’s intensity to the 
consumer who broke the contract. If a consumer broke 
the contract after contracting with commercial bank, the 
bank could get the information from PCIMS, and other 
banks can obtain his information though the system later. 
Then, his credit grade in other banks will be reduced, 
and he will be given less, or even be refused in future. 
At the same time, the open system can afford the 
reference for the people. The people will know the 
consumer’s record of violating agreement. Thus, 
consumers that have the record of violating agreement 
will not be awarded the credit. This lesson even is more 
than law punishment. 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
From the above analysis, we can see that the essential of 
consumer credit activities is a kind of games between 
commercial banks and consumers, and the most 
important condition to guarantee each player’s to 
maximize their own revenue, is the personal credit 
information being shared completely in whole society, 
at least in all of commercial banks.  
In present China’s personal credit consumption 
market, consumers give enough believe to the 
commercial banks. On the contrary, the commercial 
banks are much difficult to learn about the consumers’ 
credit statuses who apply for the bank’s credit facilities, 
because there is not a right channel, from which the 
commercial banks can obtain enough these consumers’ 
credit information with a low cost. The profit from 
personal credit consumption market is high, and the 
market possesses the capacity for growth or 
development, so the banks want to develop consumer 
credit services certainly. But the banks have to pay more 
on estimating the consumers’ credit grades which can 
reflect the probability of the consumer returning the 
loan, because of the lack of the consumer’s credit 
information. In order to counteract the risk, the 
commercial banks set a more fuzzy process for 
consumers to obtain the credit facilities, for example, 
more serve guarantee system, mortgage terms, or 
qualification. In China’s personal credit consumption 
market, if a person wants to buy some durable consumer 
goods with credit facilities, he must disburse a large 
number of the first payment, and then he must offer 
enough personal information to a commercial bank with 
a lot of document which can reflect his income, 
marriage, capital asserts, and so on. The process is so 
complex and fuzzy.  
The greatest obstacle of the development of China’s 
consumer credit has been that there is not a right 
information platform, through which the commercial 
banks can obtain enough personal information, to 
sustain the consumer credit behavior’s operating 
healthily. The information platform, which can be called 
Personal Credit Information Management System, can  
(1)obtain all kinds of information which contain the 
credit applicant's Character ， Capacity ， Capital ，
Condition and Collateral (5C) from correlative social 
departments, especially commercial banks; (2) 
coordinate the information; and (3) spread the 
information in whole society at a enough low cost. In 
china, the government has the greatest capability to 
distribute the social resource, so the PCIMS’s building 
requires the main support from the government. For 
example, the collection of credit information relates to a 
lot of social departments, and the work can only be 
achieved under the government’s support, including 
correlative policies, laws, manpower, and fund.  
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